Volume 9

Abstract. This paper argues that the rapid growth and success of the Russian mail order bride (MOB) industry since the 1990s is dependent on the concurrent timing of the fall of the Soviet Union and the proliferation of computers and the internet. The paper will analyze how the Russian MOB industry has responded to changes in technology, beginning with an examination of the history of the MOB industry and detailing the effects of technology on matchmaking agency websites and money transfer systems. Drawing from content analysis of current online MOB profiles, websites, and agency information, along with personal interviews and a review of statistics and available literature, this paper examines how both MOBs and the MOB industry as a whole have responded to changes in the MOB market that have been brought on by technological innovations and how this has led to the commercialization of the industry. This paper concludes with a prediction of the future growth trajectory of the MOB industry based on the impacts of the most recent technological innovations on the Russian MOB industry. This examination will provide evidentiary support as to why the Russian MOB industry has grown at a faster rate than the MOB industry of other regions.

Abstract. Throughout history, national identity has been a powerful tool through which people identify themselves and relate to others. According to scholar Anthony D. Smith, national identity is an inherent sentiment that allows individuals to gather in a collective group. In Eastern Europe, national identity grew even through periods of foreign occupation and was mobilized as foreign occupation came to an end. This is especially seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s three national groups: the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.

Members of all three national groups lived together in Yugoslavia, which was dismantled and subsequently erupted into a bloody civil war in the early 1990s. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), which was signed in 1995, ended the war. In addition, the DPA created modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), dividing the nation into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation), which is ethnically Bosniak and Croat, and Republika Srpska (RS), which is ethnically Serb.

Some proposed arguments for Yugoslavia’s downfall include the following: economic, role of personality, nationalism, cultural, and international politics. Elements of each of these arguments persist in BiH because of the desire to protect the national identities of these three ethnic groups. These elements are most evident in the ethnically divided and corrupt government, tension between the Federation and RS, and limited cooperation between the Bosniaks and Croats of the Federation. This leads to the conclusion that BiH will eventually fragment just as Yugoslavia did.

Abstract. Since 2011, a stalemate in the United Nations Security Council revealed irreconcilable policy divides between the U.S. and Russia on the topic of international intervention. The root of the divide lies with a vague international law precedent regarding state sovereignty and international autonomy versus protection of humanitarian rights. An idea has developed in the international community that state sovereignty does not override mass crimes against humanity, thus giving the international community an implicit “responsibility to protect” (R2P) citizens, particularly regarding military intervention. Not surprisingly, Russia and the U.S. have clashed over when R2P legitimizes intervention- in particular, during the conflicts in Kosovo (1999), Georgia (2008), Libya (2011), Syria (2011), and Ukraine (2014). Russia’s approach is contradictory: when Russia protests R2P as a justification for intervention, as with Kosovo, Libya, and Syria, it is on the basis that international forces should not be allowed to overstep political sovereignty with military maneuvers. This allows Russia to defend themselves against unwanted intervention, especially as a consequence of Russian military action. However, when Russia utilizes this responsibility, as with Georgia and Ukraine, it is because Russia’s own brand of intervention has an underlying geopolitical benefit. The lack of a clear legal framework on intervention causes strife between Russia and the U.S. and prevents a proactive international community that truly aims to protect humanitarian rights.

Abstract. The main topic of discussion in this paper is the Dima Yakovlev law with a specific intention to outline the roots of Russian opinion regarding this law, as well as to show what this opinion is. This law was implemented in 2012 by the Russian Federation to restrict United States citizens from adopting Russian born children. Despite Russia’s claim that this law came about as a result of various human rights abuses committed by U.S. citizens, the overwhelming majority of journalists and intellectuals in U.S. and Europe agree that the adoption ban was a Russian response to the passing of the “Magnitsky Act of 2012” by the United States. The attempt to gauge the Russian opinion regarding the passing of the Dima Yakovlev law has resulted in finding that the majority of Russian citizens do in fact support the law—although this claim has not proved to constitute a clear-cut answer regarding the Russian point of view. Through my research I have found that in order for any serious change to take place in Russia, there needs to be a shift in political power, and given Russia’s growing nationalist sentiments, it does not seem likely that the Dima Yakovlev law is going to have a chance at being repealed, and that for the time being and for the foreseeable future, Russian children will not be able to be adopted by American families.

Abstract. Following the end of the Soviet Union (December 26, 1991), Russia’s political and economic hardships generated a significant outflow of émigrés, forcing members of the intelligentsia, including scientists, teachers, researchers and other professionals, to leave Russia. Nevertheless, this did not necessarily apply to all scientists. The conventional belief is that, in this atmosphere, scientific funding simply evaporated, forcing scientists look for new opportunities in Western countries, hence resulting in an extensive brain drain from Russia. However, this paper demonstrates that Russia actually received a significant amount of funds from two major organizations: the International Science Foundation (ISF) and the International Science Technology Center (ISTC). These foundations made it possible for Russia to prevent most of its brain drain from occurring and indeed preserved Russian science. Believing that a massive brain drain would destroy Russian schools of science, the ISF invested approximately $110 million from 1991 to 1996 to finance Russia’s fundamental sciences (biology, anatomy, physiology, and biochemistry) and to support around 40,000 scientists. The support of ISF allowed for major contributions by Russian scientists to the international research community. Due to concerns of nuclear proliferation, the European Union and United States funded the ISTC, which commenced its operations in March of 1994. The Western fear was that Russian scientists might offer their services to nations that sponsor terrorism. Until 2011, over 75,000 Russian nuclear scientists received approximately $430 million to devote their knowledge and expertise to basic science such as chemistry, physics, and biology, rather than creating atomic bombs. The ISTC provided funding to ensure that Russian scientific research focused on peaceful activities, such as solving national and global technological problems and supporting the transition to market-based economies. Therefore, contrary to traditional thinking, the measures taken by international organizations allowed Russia to evade a significantly large brain drain and successfully preserve scientific knowledge by providing necessary funding for continuous scientific research.

Abstract. The number of people infected with HIV/AIDS in Russia is shocking. While the governments of many countries, including those of South Africa and India, have managed to get their HIV/AIDS epidemics under control, Russia’s continues to be one of the world’s only HIV/AIDS epidemics that is still growing. Despite this fact, Putin and his administration have done surprisingly little to combat the spread of the disease. HIV/AIDS is a highly stigmatized disease in Russia, making it particularly difficult to contain: it is associated with homosexuality, drug use, prostitution, and crime. Although many consider stigma to be an unfortunate but unavoidable byproduct of culture, this paper will argue that the stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS, particularly the stigma that associates HIV/AIDS with homosexuality, serves a political purpose to Putin, as it allows him to garner domestic popularity by protecting his citizens from the diseased and dangerous homosexual community as well as distract them from the more pressing political, social, and economic problems that currently face Russia. The consequences of Putin’s refusal to solve the HIV/AIDS crisis in Russia are far-reaching, as the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Russia is currently fueling a tuberculosis epidemic.

Abstract. Trotsky and Khodorkovsky are two very different figures in Russian politics. Trotsky was a revolutionary and founder of the Soviet Union; Khodorkovsky, an entrepreneur and oligarch who became the richest man in Russia by the beginning of the new millennium. However, one common theme does run through their stories: opposition. When a power vacuum was created following Lenin’s incapacitation after a series of strokes and Yeltsin’s departure from the presidency, Trotsky and Khodorkovsky were widely considered the most powerful men in the country. This supremacy was challenged with the arrival of two unexpected challengers: Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Putin. To better contest these new opponents, both Trotsky and Khodorkovsky publicly changed their image and ideology. Trotsky, the party’s disciplinarian against those who spoke out against the state and the proponent of the creation of a massive bureaucracy, suddenly began to decry the country’s bureaucratization while calling for greater inner-party democracy and the loosening of party discipline. Khodorkovsky, who had come to wealth and power through the Yeltsin administration’s corruption and the far-from-equitable privatization of the Russian economy, now argued for a more open, liberal government. In the end, Trotsky and Khodorkovsky lost their specific struggles, becoming disenfranchised from their power bases and leaving the country with no substantive domestic opposition. By studying their narratives together, it becomes possible to understand how, even when led by some of the country’s most powerful men, any attempt to create a consistent opposition in Russia is doomed to failure.

Abstract. It is clear that there are many factors that have contributed to the current crisis in Ukraine. Upon closer examination, one in particular stands out above the rest: the Russian political elite manufactured concept of Russkii Mir [Russian World]. It was made official state policy in 2007 by President Vladimir Putin as a grand strategy to use soft power to peacefully promote Russian interests abroad. However, it is inherently an ethnocentric concept based on Russian culture, values, religion and history that has been used to increase and solidify Presidential and government power domestically and in the near abroad along ethnic and nationalistic lines. Gradually since its inception, but especially since the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, Russkii Mir has become a guiding force behind Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet space. This is strongly evidenced by the annexation of Crimea and ongoing conflict in Donbas. The implications for European and Asian security are great. The “Russian World” has shown it is not limited to the territorial borders of the Russian Federation and threatens other states of the former Soviet Union. The security of the European Union is threatened as war is waged at its borders in a state seeking integration. Furthermore, relations between US-led NATO and Russia have not been this deteriorated since the Cold War. At the global level, Russkii Mir has shown that ethnicity and nationalism are still continuing to be powerful tools in fueling conflict.

Abstract. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, low level speech has been utilized by Eastern European politicians in public discourse. Both the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and ex-president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, have used this speech style during their political careers. Putin’s use of low level speech has contributed positively to his public image, painting him as a hard-liner against corruption and terrorism. On the other hand, Yanukovych’s use of low level speech strengthened his connection with a corrupt and unjust regime, tying him to criminality. This paper analyzes the respective circumstances that allowed for Putin’s utilization of a low speech style to have a positive effect on his political career while Yanukovych’s use of this same speech style had a negative affect on his own. These circumstances include Russia and Ukraine’s unique history, linguistic background, political environment at the onset of Putin and Yanukovych’s careers, and additionally the two personal narratives of both politicians.